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Abstract 
 
This paper utilizes International Monetary Fund’s high quality dataset over the period 
from 2001 to 2004, to investigate the determinants of home bias in the international 
context. This paper contributes to the existing literature by using float adjusted 
measure of home bias for 38 countries. Information asymmetries arising due to 
countries’ regulatory and legal environment have significant impact on home bias. 
Foreign listing is found to alleviate home bias. 
 
International investors exhibit a preference for nearby and same language countries. 
Capital controls, trade links and risk adjusted returns are found to significantly affect 
equity home bias. Transaction costs do not have a significant impact on the equity 
home bias.  
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INTERNATIONAL INVESTORS’ HOME BIAS IN PORTFOLIO EQUITY 
INVESTMENT 
 
1 Introduction 
The traditional international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) based on Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965) suggests that in a world of perfect financial markets, the 
mean-variance optimizer investors should hold the world market portfolio of common 
stocks. However, empirical facts suggest that investors around the globe are heavily 
biased towards domestic assets and do not hold the world market portfolio of common 
stocks (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and Werner 
(1995), Ahearne et al (2004)). This phenomenon is known as the “home bias puzzle”.  
 
The empirical investigation into the home bias puzzle is important for several reasons. 
First, globalization in general has increased capital mobility and foreign equity 
investments (Obstfeld, 1995). The identification of the relevance of capital market 
frictions promoting home bias give further insight into the future changes in portfolios. 
Second, the ongoing integration process in the European Union is likely to lead a 
change in its portfolio composition due to the joining of the Eastern European 
countries. There has also been an increased integration in Western Europe. The 
financial integration process will also affect the international portfolio equity 
composition. Third, the severe demographic changes in the European countries and 
Japan are likely to lead to a change in the capital flows. It is important for the 
estimation and prediction of future investments to know more about the effect of 
capital market frictions and the extent of capital mobility.  
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Fourth, one of the major problems in the research on home bias has been relatively 
poor quality of data on cross border holdings. In the past, the cross border holdings 
were estimated using accumulated capital flows and valuation adjustments (Tesar and 
Werner (1995)). Warnock and Cleaver (2002) show that capital flows data are ill suited 
to estimate bilateral holdings. This paper contributes to the existing literature by 
employing the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF’s) Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey (CPIS) dataset on bilateral equity holdings for the years 2001 to 
2004. CPIS reports data on foreign portfolio asset holdings (divided into equity, long 
term debt, and short term debt) by residence of issuer. In 1997, IMF conducted the first 
CPIS wherein 29 countries participated; the next survey was conducted in 2001 
wherein 69 countries participated and now CPIS is being conducted on an annual basis.  
 
Fifth, traditional studies on home bias assume that portfolio investors can hold world 
market portfolio. However, Dahlquist et al (2003) state that portfolio investors can 
only hold the float adjusted world market portfolio i.e. world portfolio of shares not 
held by insiders. This paper contributes to the existing literature on international home 
bias, by using float adjusted measure of home bias for the years 2001 to 2004. Sixth, 
optimal insider ownership depends on institutions that support corporate governance in 
a country as well as on the risks of predation by state. Home bias will tend to reduce in 
countries’ whose institutions support decentralized ownership. This paper contributes 
to the existing literature on international home bias by examining the effect of legal 
and governance indicators on home bias. Seventh, this paper also empirically 
investigates the international home bias puzzle by analysing the role of direct barriers 
to investment viz. capital controls and transaction costs; information asymmetries 
arising due to culture (language), proximity (distance) and foreign listing; and control 
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variables viz. trade links and historical risk adjusted returns. Eighth, overall this paper 
fills in the gap by empirically investigating the phenomenon of home bias puzzle in the 
international context; which is critical to understanding international portfolio positions 
and capital flows. 
 
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review of the home 
bias puzzle. Section 3 describes about home bias and float market capitalisation. 
Section 4 describes the various measures of home bias. Section 5 outlines the model of 
home bias. The empirical results are presented in section 6 and finally, section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2 Literature Review 
The earlier literature on home bias focuses on the role of barriers to international 
investment. Black (1974) and Stulz (1981) develop a two country capital market 
equilibrium model where there are barriers to cross border investment and these 
barriers can be considered as tax on net foreign investment. This tax represents various 
kinds of barriers to international investment such as direct controls on the import or 
export of capital, possibility of expropriation of foreign holdings, reserve requirements 
on bank deposits and other assets held by foreigners, restrictions on the fraction of 
business that is owned by foreigners. It may also include barriers due to information 
asymmetries i.e. unfamiliarity of residents of one country with the stock markets of 
other countries. Merton (1987) develops a model where investors hold stocks that they 
know. In this model, investors think that the risk of stocks they do not know is 
extremely high. Accordingly, the investors may overweight domestic stocks. Cooper 
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and Lessard (1981) develop an international capital market equilibrium model which 
allows for differential taxes on foreign investment depending on the country of 
investment and the origin of investor. They obtain unique solutions for taxes under 
extreme assumptions that taxes depend on the country of investment, or on the origin 
of investor. Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) extend the international capital market 
equilibrium model developed by Cooper and Lessard (1981), obtains upper bounds and 
unique solutions for the taxes under alternative assumptions, and estimates empirically 
the level of these barriers to crossborder investment. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) find 
that hedging against inflation risk cannot explain the home bias.   
 
Several papers consider the effect of indirect barriers i.e. information asymmetries on 
equity investment and home bias. French and Poterba (1991), for instance, find that 
information asymmetry can generate the same observed portfolio patterns as if 
investors expect the domestic returns to be several hundred basis points higher than the 
returns in foreign markets. Gehrig (1993) uses a noisy rational expectations model to 
investigate the effect of asymmetric information between domestic and foreign 
investors. Investors observe noisy signals with different degrees of precision. The 
domestic investors receive signals of future returns that are more precise. The investors 
remain incompletely informed, even in equilibrium. Domestic bias arises from better 
investor information about domestic stocks. Thus, on average foreign investments 
appear to be more risky. Hasan and Simaan (2000) derive the premium that an investor 
is willing to pay to buy the full information of the mean return vector and show that 
rational investors prefer home country dominated portfolios over diversified portfolios 
if the variability of estimation errors far exceeds the variability of the mean return 
vector.  
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There are several papers related to cultural-proximity barriers and equity investment. 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001) show that the weight of a US stock in US mutual 
funds is negatively related to the distance between the location of the fund and the 
location of the headquarters of the firm. The mutual fund managers do better with their 
holdings of stocks of firms located more closely to where the mutual fund is located. 
Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) state that distance affects bilateral asset holdings mainly 
through its impact on trade in goods. Once the impact of trade in goods on equity 
holdings is taken into consideration, distance looses its significance as an explaining 
factor for equity holdings. This variable is expected to have a negative impact of 
foreign equity holdings. Sarkissian and Schill (2004) find that geographic, economic, 
cultural, and industrial proximity play a dominant role in the selection of overseas 
listing stock exchange. Their findings imply that proximity constraints that lead to 
home bias in investment portfolio decisions are similar to those which influence 
financing decisions. For Finland, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) show that language 
matters in an investor’s portfolio allocation. Finnish investors whose native language is 
Swedish are more likely to own stocks of companies in Finland that have annual 
reports in Swedish and whose CEOs speak Swedish than those investors whose native 
language is Finnish. For Korea, Choe, Kho and Stulz (2001) find that foreign investors 
buy at higher prices than resident investors and sell at lower prices. Shukla and van 
Inwegen (1995) show that UK money managers under perform American money 
managers when picking US stocks. Hau (2001) finds that proprietary trades on the 
German stock market do better when they are geographically closer to Frankfurt. 
 
There are several papers investigating the home bias puzzle related to individual 
countries. Kang and Stulz (1997) study the home bias related to foreign stock 
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ownership in Japan. They find that foreign investors concentrate on equity investments 
in large, export oriented and good accounting performance firms. Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001) characterise foreign ownership by analysing dataset of ownership 
and attributes of Swedish firms. They find that foreigners show preference for large 
firms, firms paying low dividends, and firms with large cash positions on their balance 
sheets. Kim and Wei (2002) test the hypothesis that non-resident foreign investors in 
Korea, may herd more than resident foreign investors like Korean subsidiaries and 
branches of foreign institutions as the latter have more timely information about the 
country they live in. They find that a significant information asymmetry exists between 
the resident foreign investors and non-resident foreign investors. For the United States 
(US), Ahearne et al (2004) find that information cost is an important factor behind the 
home bias phenomenon. For Australia, Mishra and Daly (2006) state that the major 
determinants of Australia’s geographical allocation of portfolio investment indicate a 
broad correspondence between stock market capitalisation of destination countries and 
the allocation of Australian financial investments but with some deviations from that 
baseline, where the deviations are correlated with Australian trade patterns. 
 
Dahlquist et al (2003) show that home bias is closely linked to corporate governance. 
They show that United States investors underweight those foreign countries in their 
portfolios which have closely held firms. They construct an estimate of the world float 
portfolio. They also analyse Swedish firm level data on foreign ownership and closely 
held shares and show that the weight of a Swedish firm in the portfolio of foreign 
investors is inversely related to the fraction of firm held by controlling share holders.   
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3. Home Bias and Float Market Capitalisation 
The ICAPM suggests that to maximize risk adjusted returns, investors should hold 
equities from countries around the world in proportion to their market capitalisation. 
Table 1 compares the actual share of domestic equities in the home portfolio with the 
benchmark share in the world portfolio as per the ICAPM model. Column (1) of Table 
1 shows strong preference for domestic equities. For instance, the actual domestic 
equity holding of Australia in 2002 was 78.08 %. Column (2) of Table 1 indicates the 
share of each country in the world market portfolio as predicted by ICAPM; under the 
assumptions of complete global capital markets, where there are no barriers to 
international investment. The benchmark equity holding of Australia in 2002 was 1.84 
%. The actual percentage of domestic equity holdings is much greater than the 
benchmark percentage as computed from the ICAPM and investors’ portfolios are 
heavily biased towards domestic equities. This differential is very high and investors 
around the globe have a bias towards domestic securities. The situation where investors 
hold far too high a share of their wealth in domestic securities compared with the 
optimal share predicted by the traditional theory of portfolio choice is termed as the 
‘home bias puzzle’.  
 
The paper measures home bias as, 
 
 ijHomeBias     =       1- share of foreign equities at domestic level  
                                      share of foreign equities in world float portfolio 
 
Home bias is equivalent to normalizing source country holdings in host country by the 
country’s float market capitalisation and then dividing by the share of source country 
holdings in the worldwide float market capitalisation. 
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The traditional theory of home bias calculates the world market portfolio assuming that 
all shares issued by a corporation could potentially be held by foreign investors. 
Ahearne et al (2004) employ the traditional approach to measure home bias in United 
States.  
 
La Porta et al (1999) state that firms outside the United States are typically controlled 
by large resident shareholders (insiders). Foreign investors cannot hold the shares held 
by insiders within a company. Dahlquist et al (2003) state that foreign investors can 
hold the world market portfolio of shares not held by insiders. This measure of world 
market portfolio is known as the float adjusted world market portfolio.  
 
The empirical analysis in this paper employs the float adjusted home bias measure for 
the years 2001 to 2004. The float market capitalisation is computed using the World 
scope database.      
 
 
4. Measures of Home Bias  
4.1 Explicit Costs  
Black (1974), Stulz (1981), Cooper and Kaplanis (1986), Aherane and Griever (2004) 
state that investors face explicit costs related to equity investment viz. transaction fees, 
taxes, commissions, and the costs of gathering information.   
 
(i) Capital Controls ( )jtrolCapitalCon  
With the advent of liberalization, capital controls have been reduced in many countries 
and foreign investors are allowed to invest in stock markets of both, developed 
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countries as well as emerging countries. However, capital controls can still affect the 
equity investment and lead to home bias.  
 
This paper employs the Miniane (2004) capital control measures. Miniane (2004) has 
utilized the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange 
Restrictions (AREAER) and extended the IMF’s post 1996 disaggregated capital 
account indices back to 1983 for a sample of 34 countries. The disaggregated indices 
are better than the pre-1996 single dummy in tracking both global trends toward capital 
account liberalization and country specific liberalization during that period. This 
variable is expected to have positive impact on the measure of home bias. 
 
(ii) Transaction Costs ( )jnCostTransactio  
Home bias can arise due to high transaction costs associated with trading foreign 
equities. The transaction cost data is derived from Elkins-McSherry Co. Elkins-
McSherry Co. receives trade data on all global trades by institutional traders and 
computes measures of trading costs. The trading cost data comprises of three cost 
components viz. commissions, fees and market impact costs. This paper takes into 
account the total cost comprising of all the three cost components for the years 2001 to 
2004. Investors would underweight high transaction cost countries’ in their portfolios. 
Therefore, this variable is expected to have positive impact on the measure of home 
bias. 
 
4.2  Proximity Costs  
Mishra (2006); Sarkissian and Schill (2004); Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004); Coval and 
Moskowitz (1999, 2001) and Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that distance and 
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language play a dominant role in investors’ preference for equity investment. The 
following section discusses two proximity measures of home bias, distance and 
language. 
 
(i)  Distance ( )ijDist  
Distance is the distance between capital city of source and host country.2 Geographical 
distance is a barrier to interaction among economic agents and cultural exchange. 
Investors prefer investing in countries which are in geographic proximity due to lower 
information costs arising from cultural similarities and familiarity. This variable is 
expected to have a positive impact on the measure of home bias.  
 
(ii)  Language ( )ijLanguage  
Language is the common language dummy variable which is equal to one if source and 
host country share a common language; otherwise its value is zero.3 The cultural 
proximity arising from common language is important for bilateral equity investment 
and investors prefer investing in countries having common language due to cultural 
similarities and familiarity. This variable is expected to have a negative impact on the 
measure of home bias.  
 
4.3 Regulatory and Corporate Governance Information Costs 
Generally, the investors gather information about the foreign firms by analysing their 
accounting statements and historical stock market data. The accounting information is 
based on accounting principles and disclosure requirements that may differ greatly 
                                                 
2
 http://www.indo.com/distance/ 
3
 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/  
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from those in their home countries. The credibility of this information is determined to 
a large extent by the regulatory environment that varies from country to country. The 
cross country differences in accounting practices, disclosure requirements and 
regulatory environments give rise to information asymmetries between local and 
foreign investors. Foreign investors have to translate and interpret this information in 
light of the relevant legal and business environment which leads to additional costs. 
These information costs associated with investing in some countries may be 
significantly higher than in others. Accordingly, this paper investigates the impact of 
countries’ accounting standards, disclosure requirements, regulatory environments and 
corporate governance standards on the measure of home bias. These legal and 
governance indices are expected to have a negative impact on the measure of home 
bias. A brief description of these legal and governance indices is provided below: 
 
(i) La Porta et al (1998) legal indicators 
This paper considers three legal indices of La Porta et al (1998) viz. efficiency of 
judicial system, rule of law and rating of accounting standards. 
 
The efficiency of judicial system ( )EFF  index is developed by the country risk rating 
agency Business International Corporation. This index assesses the efficiency and 
integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms. It 
may be taken to represent investors’ assessments of conditions in the country in 
question. This index scales from 0 to 10, with lower scores for lower efficiency levels 
and is averaged over the period from 1980 to 1983. 
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Rule of law ( )ROL  index developed by the country risk rating agency International 
Country Risk (ICR) assesses the law and order tradition in the country. This index 
scales from 0 to 10, with lower scores for less tradition for law and order and is 
average of the months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 
1995. 
 
Rating of accounting standards ( )RA  is the index created by the International 
Accounting and Auditing Trends; by examining and rating companies’ 1990 annual 
reports on their omission or inclusion of ninety items. These items fall into seven 
categories viz. general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow 
statement, accounting standards, stock data and special items. A minimum of three 
companies in each country were studied that represented a cross-section of various 
industry groups where industrial companies numbered seventy percent and financial 
companies represented the remaining thirty percent.  
 
(ii) Kaufmann et al (2005) governance indicators 
Kaufmann et al (2005) construct six indicators each representing a different dimension 
of governance viz. voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law and graft for approximately 160 countries.  
 
Voice and accountability ( )VACC  index is based on concepts that measure the extent 
to which the state engages in repression of its citizens and the extent to which the state 
relies on tactics commonly considered illegitimate in the international community in 
carrying out internal security tasks. This index focuses on various indicators related to 
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political process, civil rights, and institutions that facilitate citizen control of 
government actions, such as media independence.  
 
Political stability and lack of violence ( )PS  index combines indicators that measure 
the risk of a destabilization or removal from power of the government in a violent or 
unconstitutional way. The concepts measured include military coup risk, major 
insurgency, political assassination civil war, social unrest, frequency of political 
killings, civil unrest, terrorism etc.  
 
Government Effectiveness ( )GE  and Regulatory Quality ( )RQ  indices comprise of 
indicators that focus on the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
policies. Government Effectiveness index comprises of indicators that measure the 
quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the quality of public service 
provision and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its policies. 
Regulatory Quality index consists of indicators related to the regulations of exports, 
imports, business ownerships, equities ownerships, banking, foreign investment, price 
controls, tariffs, unfair competitive practices etc.  
 
The Rule of Law ( )RL  and Control of Corruption ( )CC  indices consider the respect, 
on the part of both citizens and the government, for the institutions that resolve their 
conflicts and govern their interactions. Rule of Law index includes variables that 
measure the perceptions on the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and 
enforceability of contracts. It measures concepts related to enforceability of 
government and private contracts, fairness of judicial process, speediness of judicial 
process, violent and organised crimes, trust in legal system, patent and copyright 
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protection etc. Control of Corruption index comprises of different indicators of 
corruption. It focuses on the measure of corruption within the political system, the rate 
of severity of corruption within the state, the intrusiveness of the country’s 
bureaucracy, corruption among public officials etc.  
 
4.4 Foreign Listing ( )ijtingForeignLis  
Sarkissian and Schill (2004), Ahearne et al (2004), Baker et al (2002), Lang et al 
(2002) and Merton (1987) state that a firm may be able to overcome familiarity 
concerns and portfolio bias of foreign investors by listing in the foreign market. 
Ahearne et al (2004) state that some foreign firms have effectively reduced costs facing 
US investors by listing theirs stocks on US exchanges. A foreign firm listing on the US 
stock exchange must reconcile its accounts with US generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) and meet other stringent regulatory requirements of stock 
exchange. US investors can collect information on the US listed foreign firm more 
easily, without geographical constraints. This alleviates the information cost to US 
investors.   
 
This paper considers a foreign listing dummy which is equal to one if a source country 
company is listed on host country’s stock exchange otherwise it is zero. This variable 
is expected to have a negative impact on the measure of home bias. 
 
4.5 Trade and Diversification   
Lane and Milesi Feretti (2004) and Mishra (2006) state that bilateral equity investment 
is strongly correlated with the underlying patterns of trade in goods and services. This 
paper examines the impact of trade on the international investors’ equity home bias.  
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Bohn and Tesar (1996) state that investors are momentum traders or return chasers, 
who base their equity investment decisions on the stock markets past performance. 
They state that investors tend to move into markets where returns are expected to be 
high and retreat from markets when predicted returns are low. This paper examines the 
impact of risk to reward ratio on the international investors’ equity home bias.  
 
(i)  Trade ( )ijTrade  
 Trade  is the average of imports and exports normalised by the destination country’s 
GDP. This measure is in accordance with Aherane et al (2004). Investors are better 
able to attain accounting and regulatory information on foreign markets through trade. 
Consequently, investors may be inclined to hold the stocks of foreign companies with 
whose products they are most familiar. This variable is expected to have negative 
impact on the measure of home bias. The data on imports and exports is taken from 
IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and GDP data is from World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators.       
 
(ii) Diversification ( )jationDiversific  
Diversification measure is the ratio of mean monthly return to standard deviation. This 
measure is in accordance with Ahearne et al (2004). Investors might tend to 
underweight those countries whose stock markets have performed poorly, based on 
their information of past stock returns. This variable is expected to have negative 
impact on the measure of home bias. The return data is calculated from Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) monthly stock market indices for 120 months 
ranging from January 1995 to December 2004.  
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5. Modelling Home Bias  
This paper regresses the measure of home bias (discussed in section 2) on a vector of 
explanatory variables that includes explicit costs, proximity costs, regulatory and 
corporate governance information costs, foreign listing, trade and diversification 
(discussed in section 3).   
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) jjijijij
ijjjij
ationDiversificTradetingForeignLisLanguage
DistnCostTransactiotrolCapitalConHomeBias
χαααα
αααα
++++
++++=
7654
3210
 (1)                                                   
 
where ijHomeBias : Float adjusted measure of home bias, jtrolCapitalCon : Capital 
control measure of destination country, jnCostTransactio : Transaction cost associated 
with share trading in destination country, ijDist : Distance in kilometres between 
capital cities of source and host countries, ijLanguage : Common language dummy 
with value equal to one if source and host country have same language otherwise the 
value is zero, ijtingForeignLis : Foreign Listing dummy with value equal to one if 
source country is listed on the host country’s stock exchange otherwise the value is 
zero, ijTrade : Trade is the average of imports and exports normalised by the 
destination country’s GDP, jationDiversific : Diversification is the ratio of destination 
country’s mean monthly return to standard deviation, jχ : random error term. 
 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) jij RAROLEFFHomeBias εββββ ++++= 3210                                         (2)   
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where EFF : Efficiency of judicial system, ROL : Rule of law, RA : Rating of 
accounting standards, jε : random error term. EFF , ROL  and RA  indices are from La 
Porta et al (1998). 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) j
ij
GEFFPSF
CCRLRQGEPSVACCHomeBias
ωγγ
γγγγγγγ
++
+++++++=
87
6543210
        (3) 
   
where VACC : Voice and Accountability, PS : Political Stability and Lack of 
Violence, GE : Government Effectiveness, RQ : Regulatory Quality, RL : Rule of 
Law, CC : Control of Corruption, AVE : Average, jω : random error terms. 
 
                
6 Empirical Results 
The empirical results are based on regression equations (1) to (3) for the years 2001 to 
2004. In the international context, the source countries are Australia, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
and United States. The host countries are Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, China, Hong 
Kong, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United 
States. 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for the variables used in the paper. The measure 
of home bias is negatively related to trade, foreign listing dummy, language dummy 
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and diversification variable. Overall, the correlation matrix does not indicate serious 
correlation among the variables, except the positive correlation (0.62) between capital 
control and transaction cost.  
 
Table 3 indicates the regression results wherein the dependent variable is ijHomeBias . 
In column (1), the independent variables are ijTrade  and jtrolCapitalCon . ijTrade  is 
negative and significant. This supports the theoretical consideration that investors 
prefer investing in those countries with which they are familiar through trading 
relations. jtrolCapitalCon  is negative and significant. In column (2), the independent 
variables are ijDist  and jtrolCapitalCon . ijDist  is positive and significant; implying 
that investors prefer investing in geographically near countries. jtrolCapitalCon  is 
positive and insignificant.  ijLanguage  and jtrolCapitalCon  are the independent 
variables in column (3). ijLanguage  is negative and significant, supporting the logic 
that investors prefer investing in countries having similar language. jtrolCapitalCon  is 
positive and significant. In column (4), the independent variables are jtingForeignLis  
and jtrolCapitalCon . jtingForeignLis  is negative and significant; implying that host 
country investors prefer investing in source country on whose stock exchanges host 
country’s companies are listed. Foreign listing lowers direct transaction costs and 
indirect information costs. jtrolCapitalCon  is positive and significant. 
jationDiversific  and jtrolCapitalCon  are the independent variables in column (5). 
jationDiversific  is negative and significant; implying that investors less underweight 
countries with higher return to risk ratios. jtrolCapitalCon  is positive and significant.     
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Table 4 indicates regression results with ijHomeBias  as the dependent variable. 
Columns (1) to (4), respectively indicate the combined effects of ijTrade  with ijDist , 
ijTrade  with ijLanguage , ijTrade  with jationDiversific  and ijTrade  with 
jtingForeignLis  on ijHomeBias . Column (1) of Table 4 indicates that upon 
introducing ijDist  variable, ijTrade  losses its significance level from 1 percent to 5 
percent, as compared to column (1) of Table 3. There is a possibility that the 
international equity flows may be driven by international trade flows so that the 
distance variable picks up the effect of trade linkages rather than information. In 
column (2), both ijTrade  and ijLanguage  are negative and significant; implying that 
cultural similarities arising due to common language and familiarity arising from 
trading relations help investors’  reduce their home bias in equity investments.  
Column (3) indicates that both ijTrade  and jationDiversific  are negative and 
significant. The negative sign and significance of jationDiversific  variable verifies 
that investors less underweight stocks of countries having high reward to risk ratios. 
Again, ijTrade  and jtingForeignLis  are both, negative and significant in column (4). 
The negative sign and significance of jtingForeignLis  asserts that listing reduces 
investors’ indirect information costs thus leading to a reduction in home bias. 
jtrolCapitalCon  is found to be positive and significant, in accordance with theoretical 
consideration.     
 
Table 5 examines the effect of transaction cost on home bias. Transaction costs do not 
appear to have significant affect on the source countries investors’ home bias against 
destination countries.      
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Table 6 illustrates the impact of La Porta et al (1998) variables on ijHomeBias in the 
international context. The legal indices viz. rule of law and efficiency of judicial 
system are both negative and significant.  rating of accounting standards are all 
significant and negative. Column (1) indicates that a 100 percent increase in 
destination countries law and order results in the decrease in source countries home 
bias by 4 percent. Column (2) indicates that a 100 percent increase in destination 
countries efficiency of judicial system leads to a decrease in source countries home 
bias by 3 percent. Column (3) indicates that rating of accounting standard index is 
negative and insignificant. This is in accordance with Ahearne et al (2004). One of the 
reasons may be that the accounting standard index is available for 1990 and since 
1990s accounting standards have changed in many countries. Overall the results imply 
that the source countries have low degree of home bias against the destination 
countries that have an efficient judicial system and high tradition of law and order.  
 
Table 7 presents the regression results that show the impact of governance indicators 
on home bias in the international context. The governance indicators are negative and 
significant throughout; implying that better governance in the destination countries 
would lead to greater equity investment in source countries. This would result in lower 
degree of source countries’ equity home bias against destination countries. On 
individual basis, regulatory quality ( RQ ) variable has the greatest impact on home 
bias. A 100 percent increase in destination countries regulatory quality environment 
leads to a decrease in source countries equity home bias against destination countries 
by about 32 percent. Column (7) presents the effect of governance indicators grouped 
together (average) on home bias. A 100 percent increase in destination countries 
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governance environment leads to a decrease in source countries equity home bias 
against destination countries by about 27 percent. 
 
7 Conclusion 
This paper employs IMF’s high quality CPIS dataset to investigate the determinants of 
home bias puzzle in the international context. The data itself indicates some interesting 
stylized facts about the home bias puzzle. 
 
Capital controls are found to have a positive and significant impact on the home bias. 
Trade links are found to have a negative and significant impact on home bias; implying 
that trade alleviates certain information asymmetries in terms of familiarity with the 
financial and legal environment of the countries; cultural barriers etc. Information 
flows positively affect both cross-border finance and trade. Trade in goods and trade in 
assets become complementary: firm managers learn about each other by trading goods 
and/or securities. Trading in goods market reduces informational asymmetries in the 
financial markets (and vice versa). 
 
The paper finds that international investors exhibit a preference for nearby countries, 
same language and same culture countries. Investors acquire useful information about 
familiar firms from reading company statements in a language they understand, from 
general or acquired knowledge about local fims, or from the cultural groups they 
socialize within. The information based theory of the influence of distance, language, 
and culture leads to more active trading of these familiar firms and generates superior 
performance in these firms.  
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Foreign listing reduces transaction costs and indirect information costs through 
increased transparency and adherence to stringent stock exchange’s regulatory reforms. 
The paper finds that foreign listing alleviates equity home bias.  
 
Risk adjusted return is negative and significant implying that in their equity portfolios, 
source countries investors less underweight the destination countries that have higher 
return to risk ratios. Transaction costs are positive but insignificant.  
 
This paper also investigates the impact of legal and governance indices on homebias. 
Investors weight countries in their portfolios which have institutions that facilitate 
citizen control of government actions such as media independence; politically stability; 
efficient governing systems; high tradition of law and order; transparent corporate 
governance; and effective policies related to trade and development. Consequently, the 
degree of home bias in investors’ equity portfolios will decrease. 
 
Overall the results indicate that both regulations and information costs have impact on 
cross border equity holdings. Even among countries for which regulatory barriers to 
foreign equity holdings are small, cultural barriers seem to constitute quite significant 
barrier to equity holdings. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to analyse causes for the home bias puzzle and to 
derive implications from these findings for economic policy. This paper finds that the 
barriers to the free mobility of equity can arise from two main sources. First, policy 
measures in the form of capital controls can cause barriers to free equity flows. 
Second, even if policy induced barriers to equity flows have been lifted, there remain 
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substantial economic or market inherent barriers. These barriers tend to remain 
relevant and to affect the way in which financial systems operate and integrate even if 
economic policy has reduced regulatory barriers to entry. The asymmetries in 
information between domestic and foreign investors, which can arise from differences 
in regulatory environments, are of primary importance. The market inherent barriers 
due to fixed costs of market entry including transaction costs are also important.  
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Table 1: International Home Bias  
Countries  Actual percentage of 
domestic equity held 
by domestic investors 
 
2001                   2002 
Benchmark 
percentage as per 
ICAPM 
 
2001               2002 
Australia 75.35                 78.08 1.47                 1.84 
Austria 71.71                 80.40 0.08                 0.16 
Belgium 76.76                 73.22 0.60                 0.65 
Canada 84.09                 86.45 2.41                 2.76 
Denmark 79.14                 77.11 0.34                 0.38 
Finland 42.55                 39.35 0.77                 0.70 
France 66.72                 69.86 4.61                 4.70 
Ireland 53.88                 30.03 0.28                 0.26 
Italy 77.38                 77.34 2.09                 2.40 
Japan 86.72                 86.32 9.84               11.80 
Malaysia 10.30                   9.75 0.47                 0.61 
Netherlands 51.34                 50.19 2.22                 2.32 
New Zealand 80.97                 81.67 0.07                 0.10 
Norway 77.02                 77.25 0.27                 0.34 
Portugal 73.62                 73.21 0.20                 0.21 
Singapore 69.10                 65.78 0.46                 0.50 
Spain 68.97                 78.31 1.44                 2.25 
Sweden 68.20                 75.54 0.93                 0.99 
UK 67.98                 63.89 8.75                 9.10 
US 92.82                 91.39 54.86             51.51 
 
Source: Foreign equity investments from the IMF’s CPIS, market capitalizations from FIBV 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix (2001 to 2004) 
 
 
ijHomeBias  ijTrade  ijFL  ijDist  ijLan  jCC  jTC  ijDiver  
ijHomeBias  
 -0.16 -0.04 0.30 -0.08 0.13 0.01 -0.09 
ijTrade  
  0.01 -0.24 0.21 -0.01 0.12 -0.03 
ijFL  
   -0.09 0.16 -0.32 -0.26 0.18 
ijDist  
    0.04 0.27 0.14 -0.24 
ijLan  
     -0.19 -0.09 0.05 
jCC  
      0.62 -0.34 
jTC  
       -0.29 
ijDiver  
        
 
Note: 
 
ijHomeBias : Float adjusted measure of home bias, jCC : Capital control measure of destination 
country, jTC : Transaction cost associated with share trading in destination country, ijDist : Distance 
in kilometres between capital cities of source and host countries, ijLan : Common language dummy 
with value equal to one if source and host country have same language otherwise the value is zero, 
ijFL : Foreign Listing dummy with value equal to one if source country is listed on the host country’s 
stock exchange otherwise the value is zero, ijTrade : Trade is the average of imports and exports 
normalised by the destination country’s GDP, ijDiver : Diversification is the ratio of destination 
country’s mean monthly return to standard deviation. 
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Table 3: International Home Bias Regression Results I (2001 to 2004) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ijTrade  -0.01* 
(-4.08) 
    
jtrolCapitalCon  0.33* 
(6.13) 
0.03 
(0.70) 
0.28* 
(4.23) 
0.24* 
(3.60) 
0.22* 
(3.30) 
ijDist   0.58* 
(12.94) 
   
ijLanguage    -0.26** 
(-2.28) 
  
jtingForeignLis     -0.23* 
(-2.78) 
 
jationDiversific      -1.12* 
(-4.40) 
Constant 0.43* 
(12.82) 
-1.61* 
(-9.58) 
0.42* 
(10.66) 
0.44* 
(10.46) 
0.52* 
(11.80) 
Adjusted R2 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Observations 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285 
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. ijHomeBias : Float adjusted measure of home bias, jtrolCapitalCon : 
Capital control, ijDist : Distance, ijLanguage : Common language dummy, ijtingForeignLis : 
Foreign Listing dummy, ijTrade : Trade , jationDiversific : reward to risk ratio.  
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Table 4: International Home Bias Regression Results II (2001 to 2004) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ijTrade  -0.00** 
(-2.44) 
-0.01** 
(-3.37) 
-0.02* 
(-4.31) 
-0.01* 
(-3.92) 
jtrolCapitalCon  0.04 
(0.85) 
0.29* 
(4.34) 
0.19* 
(2.98) 
0.23* 
(3.49) 
ijDist  0.56* 
(12.73) 
   
ijLanguage   -0.20*** 
(-1.65) 
  
jtingForeignLis     -0.23* 
(-2.77) 
jationDiversific    -1.22* 
(-4.82) 
 
Constant 1.50* 
(-9.12) 
0.47* 
(12.76) 
0.61* 
(13.57) 
0.51* 
(12.66) 
Adjusted R2 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Observations 1285 1285 1285 1285 
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. ijHomeBias : Float adjusted measure of home bias, jtrolCapitalCon : 
Capital control, ijDist : Distance, ijLanguage : Common language dummy, ijtingForeignLis : 
Foreign Listing dummy, ijTrade : Trade , jationDiversific : reward to risk ratio.  
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Table 5: Effect of Transaction Cost on International Home Bias (2001 to 2004) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ijTrade  -0.03* 
(-4.31) 
     
jnCostTransactio  0.00 
(1.16) 
-0.00 
(-0.93) 
0.00 
(0.26) 
-0.00 
(-0.49) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
0.00 
(0.15) 
ijDist   0.77* 
(11.40) 
    
ijLanguage    -0.32** 
(-2.47) 
   
jtingForeignLis      -0.14*** 
(-1.71) 
-0.00*** 
(-1.79) 
jationDiversific     -1.67* 
(-5.10) 
  
Constant 0.41* 
(3.92) 
-2.30* 
(-9.05) 
0.42* 
(3.96) 
0.61* 
(4.57) 
0.41* 
(3.43) 
0.41* 
(3.49) 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Observations 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285 
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. ijHomeBias : Float adjusted measure of home bias, jnCostTransactio : 
Transaction cost, ijDist : Distance, ijLanguage : Common language dummy, ijtingForeignLis : 
Foreign Listing dummy, ijTrade : Trade , jationDiversific : reward to risk ratio.  
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Table 6: Effect of Legal Indices on Home Bias (2001 to 2004) 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
ROL  -0.04 
(-3.95)* 
  
EFF   -0.03 
(-3.30)* 
 
RA    -0.00 
(-0.42) 
Constant 0.75 
(7.77)* 
0.67 
(9.32)* 
0.60 
(4.12)* 
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 na 
Observation 1188 1188 1188 
 
Note: *,** and *** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected t-
statistics in parenthesis. ROL : Rule of law. EFF : Efficiency of judicial system. RA : Rating of 
accounting standards. na: not applicable. Legal Indices are from La Porta et al (1998).  
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Table 7: Effect of Governance Indices on Home Bias (2001 to 2004) 
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VACC  -0.33 
(-7.62)* 
      
PS   -0.25 
(-6.25)* 
     
GE    -0.19 
(-5.91)* 
    
RQ     -0.32 
(-6.65)* 
   
RL      -0.22 
(-7.12)* 
  
CC       -0.13 
(-6.51)* 
 
AVE        -0.27 
(-7.14)* 
Constant 0.76 
(28.35)* 
0.60 
(30.00)* 
0.69 
(20.40)* 
0.82 
(23.06)* 
 
0.70 
(30.90)* 
0.61 
(21.62)* 
0.74 
(28.20)* 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Observation 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285 1285 
 
Note: *,** and **** indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. White corrected 
t-statistics in parenthesis. Voice and Accountability ( )VACC , Political Stability and Lack of Violence 
( PS ), Government Effectiveness ( GE ), Regulatory Quality ( RQ ), Rule of Law ( RL ), Control of 
Corruption (CC ), Average ( )AVE .  Governance Indices are from Kaufmann et al (2005).  
